Many observers have noted similarities between dreams, hallucinogenic drug states, and schizophrenia. In the present article, certain fundamental areas of convergence between the three states are described. Consideration is given to the hallucinogenic drug model of psychosis: the reasons for its initial attractiveness, and the reasons for its current disfavor. The concept of ego boundaries is defined, examined, and applied to the three states. In these states, the ego's capacity to average or synthesize various self-representations into a continuous, coherent self is compromisedleading to an impairment of the reality-oriented secondary process, and the emergence of the florid attributes of the primary process. This can account for many of the familiar characteristics of the three states. Current neurophysiological theories of dream and hallucinogenic drug states are presented, with emphasis upon serotonin neurotransmission. Serotonin appears to play a prominent role in the regulation of these states. The analogy contained in the present article suggests that serotonin may play a role in regulating schizophrenic states as well. marked, "A dream, then, is a psychosis" (Freud 1940, p. 172) .
One cannot escape the impression, from these observations, that the sodo-psychological behavior changes showed similarities with the general behavior of the mentally ill and that they provide fundamental implications in the field of psychotherapy, (p. 883] The numerous studies alluded to above helped form the thesis that the chemically induced psychosis resulting from the administration of hallucinogenic agents was similar, if not altogether identical, to the "naturally" occurring functional psychoses, particularly schizophrenia. Not unexpectedly, what followed this wave of investigation was its logical antithesis-that is, that the drug-induced and schizophrenic states were markedly different, and could, in fact, easily be distinguished by professional observers (MacDonald and Galvin 1956; Hollister 1962; Jacobsen 1963) . Where Rinkel et al. (1952) had described similarities in "disturbances of thought and speech; changes in affect and mood; perception; production of hallucinations and delusions; depersonalization and changes in behavior" (p. 577), Hollister (1968) cited differences in the type of hallucination (mainly visual for drug-induced states, mainly auditory in schizophrenia); frequency of delusions (common among schizophrenics, rare in drug-induced states); interpersonal relations (schizophrenics are characteristically withdrawn, while subjects with drug-induced psychoses prefer to have a companion); and speech (drug users' speech is "usually related to reality" while schizophrenic speech is "vague, ambiguous and difficult to follow") (p. 118). Since the two Hollister studies are by far the most frequently cited ones in dispute of the hallucinogenic drug model of psychosis, they bear closer scrutiny.
Hollister 's (1968) findings coincide with those of others (Feinberg 1962; Malitz, Wilkens, and Esecover 1962; West 1975) in citing a predominantly visual hallucinatory pattern in drug subjects, as opposed to a primarily auditory pattern among schizophrenics. However, these observations were based on comparisons using chronic schizophrenic patients. Chapman (1966) interviewed 40 young schizophrenics (mean age •= 24.6 years) with a recent onset of illness (average -11 months' duration) and discovered that disturbances in visual perception, including hallucinations, occurred with far greater frequency than disturbances in auditory perception. Young (1974) compared 20 recent onset schizophrenics (mean age -19.5 years) with 20 age-, sex-, and occupation-matched , LSD subjects (and 20 matched controls). No significant differences were found on five of seven measures of visual perception. Visual hallucinations occurred in 12/20 LSD subjects and 9/20 schizophrenics. Young concluded that the two states are initial--ly similar with regard to visual perceptual changes. A carefully controlled study by Freedman and Chapman (1973) found more changes in categories of visual perception than in auditory perception among "early" schizophrenics. McCabe et al. (1972) found that visual hallucinations occurred significantly more often in the acute than in the chronic schizophrenic state. Fischer (1972, p. 82) wrote: the perceptual and especially visual experiences of the incipient stages of schizophrenia are not unlike those induced by LSD or mescaline and auditory hallucinations only become prevalent after the process has lasted for some weeks or months. Hoffer and Osmond (1960) suggested that visual perceptual disturbances occur with greater frequency in chronic schizophrenia than is generally reported, and that a gradual adaptation to these takes place over time. Similar explanations have been of- (Opler 1956; Al-Issa 1977) . It is more prudent to assume that sodocultural and methodological differences account for the wide variations in data than to assume that the biological mechanism of schizophrenia differs from year to year, or from country to country. For the same reason, it is precipitous to label the LSD state a poor model of schizophrenic psychosis because nowadays more chronic schizophrenics in the United States admit to having auditory hallucinations than visual hallucinations. In this country, the term "drug culture" came to signify the highly visible psychedelic phenomenon which took place during the 1960s. The term itself underscores the inseparability of cultural determinants from the hallucinatory experience. When one compares a healthy, volunteer LSD subject who certainly has some sense of expectation-not to say hope-of short-lived changes in visual perception to a hospitalized chronic schizophrenic who is not given an experimental drug and has no reason to expect altered visual perception, it is hardly surprising that an LSD subject will usually report more visual hallucinations (Winters 1975 Promptly it became apparent that the technique did not allow for complete blindness: drug subjects talked mainly in the present tense, schizophrenics in the past; drug subjects betrayed by accent and diction a generally higher level of education and social function than schizophrenics. For these reasons, specific instructions were given the raters to rate the interviews only on content, even if they had reason to believe the rating was actually in error. [Hollister 1962, pp.
85-86]
As Denber (1962, p. 91) comments in his discussion of this study, "[Hollister's] statement reminded me of the judge telling the jury, after the prosecutor had made a telling point, to strike that mark from the record. Obviously it is impossible, once the raters know something about it, to say that we shall disregard those things." Furthermore, some authorities believe that the drug doses that were used may have been too low (Grinspoon and Bakalar 1979). Despite these difficulties, authors who discount the hallucinogenic drug model of psychosis most often cite this study (and Hollister 1968) as convincing evidence of the model's shortcomings. In contrast, Hoffer (1956) taped verbatim interviews with an LSD subject and an acute schizophrenic. The recordings were then played before a group of experienced psychiatrists who were unable to distinguish the patient from the drug subject. Ironically, many years after his original studies, Hollister reevaluated his position. In comparing new onset schizophrenia to the LSD state, he acknowledged "a greater resemblance than was formerly thought" (Hollister 1978, p. 416).
It would seem, then, that the case against the hallucinogenic drug model of psychosis has several weaknesses. The argument for an analogy between the two states must demonstrate that they share certain fundamental properties. In the following pages, consideration is given to these fundamental properties, and the analogy is expanded to include dream states.
Ego Boundaries
Savage ( review Federn's original concept and the subsequent revision and interpretation it has undergone in the literature. Federn used the term to denote a dynamic set of temporospatial limits which divide experience into past, present, and future; internal and external; real and unreal. For Federn, the ego presented a unique paradox because it is normally experienced as both subject and object at once. Jacobson (1954, p. 520), using Hartmann's (1950) distinction between "ego" and "self," noted that Federn's subject and object components of the ego corresponded to the "system ego" and the "selfrepresentation," respectively. Federn's "ego boundary" is identical with the boundary between self-representation and object-representation (Jacobson 1954) .
From clinical observation, Federn noted that in incipient psychosis or, in healthy persons, upon falling asleep, the ego (self-representation) boundaries lose their cathexis. Enlarging upon Federn's observations, Spiegel (1959) wrote that the accurate perception of reality depends upon the ego's continuous averaging of self-representations to form a constant frame of reference: the self. The regressive loss of this averaged self-representation in dreams and psychosis leads to a chaotic condition in which various ego states succeed one another without a common reference point. This renders a loss of temporal continuity to experience. The hypnogogic phenomena described by Isakower (1938) are prototypical of such experience. Moreover, internal processes can no longer be distinguished from external ones. Sensory phenomena strike the weakened ego boundaries with unaccustomed impact; colors and sounds are imagined as having increased intensity. The distinction between self and nonself is blurred. In this state of altered temporal and spatial relationships, the notion of causality is secondarily affected. Thelmar (1937, p. 253 ) stated, commenting on her own psychosis, 'lunatics do not 'lose their reason': they merely reason from false premises." While Federn's observations of this phenomenon were confined to schizophrenic and dream states, others have described a similar process in hallucinogenic drug states (Linton and Langs 1962; Cohen 1964; Barr et al. 1972) . Sarlin (1962) considered the withdrawal of cathexis from the self-representation to be the basis for depersonalized states in general. The following accounts typify the kind of primary experience which such formulations attempt to reconstruct: I became aware of the body that encased me as being very heavy and amorphous. Inside it, everything was stirring and seemed to be drawing me inward. [Masters and Houston 1966, pp. 9-10] (D) I feel as though I'm not alive-as though my body is an empty, lifeless shell. I seem to be standing apart from the rest of the world. [Bockner 1949, p. 969 
] (S)
The decathexis of the selfrepresentation in dreams, hallucinogenic drug states, and acute psychosis results in a dichotomous experience characterized by a weakening of the ego's identification with the self. The ego, the structure to which we attribute the function of perception, including perception of the self (Hartmann 1950), only partially and imperfectly perceives a relation to the self. Writers have used a variety of terms to describe this dichotomy. Kleinman, Gillin, and Wyatt (1977, p. 573) describe LSD subjects and schizophrenics who experience a "separation of body and soul." One of Klee's (1963, p. 463 ) LSD subjects states, "I feel like I'm a bystander watching myself." Jacobson (1959, p. 608) wrote that the depersonalized state which often heralds an acute schizophrenic psychosis results from a "schism" in the ego. Linton and Langs (1964, p. 480) reported for their LSD subjects that "the observing self became dissociated from the experiencing self." Stamm (1962) and Arlow (1966) observed that this dissociation comprised the basis of depersonalized states; the latter author emphasized its occurrence in dreams. Laing (1965, p. 71) mentioned "a divorce of self from body" in describing the schizophrenic existence.
What links these various characterizations is that each describes an estrangement of the "participating" self from the "observing" or perceiving agent. This estrangement is the essential or enabling mechanism in the everyday occurrence of daydreams and transient depersonalizations. It consists initially in a disruption of the ego's ongoing synthesis of the various self-representations into a continuous, coherent self. A sustained disruption compromises the ego's perception of the relationships between individual self-representations. Eventually, the connections may be lost; the ego may identify with one or another self-representation, but can no longer identify with a continuous, coherent self. It is to this process that Federn loosely refers in describing a decathexis of the ego boundaries. This estrangement is the fundamental process which is seen alike in dreams, hallucinogenic drug states, and acute psychosis. Its relation to the loss of reality testing and the emergence of the primary process in these three states can now be made clear.
Freud ( tinguishing perceptions from ideas, however intensely recalled. Our whole relation to the external world, to reality, depends on our ability to do so." Rapaport (1951) recognized that the discrimination between idea and perception depends upon one's capacity for "reflective awareness," which he defined as follows:
It seems to be a sub-species of the function that distinguishes imagery from hallucination and percept, thought from reality. The following are some form-variables of reflective awareness: ideation without specific awareness, ideation with awareness, awareness with awareness that one is aware, etc. [p. 302] Schafer (1968, p. 91) enlarged upon this reasoning. He stated that reality testing requires an ability to represent "oneself as thinker of the thought-what shall henceforth be called the reflective self representation" (author's italics). Schafer argued that the suspension of reflective self-representation enables the turning away from reality in dreams and psychosis. Moreover, he surmised that this is what Freud (1938, p. 276) alluded to in describing the "splitting of the ego" which occurs in these states. Thus Schafer relates the loss of reality in dreams and psychosis to the dichofomous experience described above. Reflective awareness, or reflective self-representation, requires complete identification between the perceiving agent ("thinker of the thought") and the participating self. In dreams, hallucinogenic drug states, and psychosis the participating self is represented as a series of discontinuous selves or parts of selves. Reflective self-representation is suspended; reality is lost. Without the coherent organization of various self-representations into a continuous self, the secondary process is impaired, and the primary process predominates. Noy (1969) observed that the secondary process depends upon: (1) the capacity to maintain a constant inner representation of the self and of objects; (2) the capacity to distinguish between self and object and thus between internal and external phenomena; (3) the capacity to shift from "thing-presentation" to "wordpresentation." We have seen that the ability to meet the first two criteria is impaired in the three states under consideration. We may now call attention to the third criterion.
Freud (1917) elaborated on the mechanism by which primary process transformations occur in dreams:
In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word-' presentations are taken back to the thing-presentations which correspond to them. . . . The primary psychical process is brought to bear on these memories, till, by condensation of them and displacement between their respective cathexes, it has shaped the manifest dream content, [p. 228] Arieti (1955, p. 244) has observed this process, which he calls "perceptualization of the concept," in the evolution of schizophrenic hallucination. Klee (1963, p. 467) noted the "visual, hallucinatory quality" of the thought of LSD subjects. Both Arieti, in describing schizophrenics, and Klee, in describing LSD subjects, relate this regressive transformation to • the "concrete attitude" described by Goldstein (1944) . Goldstein defined the concrete attitude as one in which the subject is unable to transcend the immediate sensory impressions imparted by the environment and proceed to the level of conceptual thinking and abstraction. From similar observations, Salzinger (1971) developed an "immediacy hypothesis" which seeks to explain schizophrenic symptomatology by this phenomenon. Hartocollis (1980, p. 862) wrote, "In a dream everything is experienced much more immediately than in awakeful reality." Concerning LSD subjects, Klee (1963, p. 469) wrote, "The relationship to objects, including people, takes on an unusual quality and depth and an immediacy which dissolves the ordinary experience of continuity from moment to moment." It is this quality of vivid, immediate sense-imagery which characterizes the primary process. Its presence signifies an impairment of the secondary process and a regressive transformation from a word-presentation to a thingpresentation mode of thought.
Freud (1900, p. 295; 1915, p. 199 ) observed that in dreams and in schizophrenia words undergo condensation and displacement via the primary process; this produces the neologisms and other transformations which characterize schizophrenic speech. The same transformations have been observed in LSD states (Savage and Cholden 1956; Klee 1963; Grinspoon and Bakalar 1979) . Fliess (1953) observed that the dreamer treats verbal residues in the manner of a schizophrenic-words are not conceived as symbols of objects, but as objects themselves. Identical observations have been made regarding the hallucinogenic drug state (Krippner 1970; Grinspoon and Bakalar 1979) and schizophrenia (Hollister 1968 ). Fisher (1954 concluded from his tachistoscope experiments that in dreams visual percepts are treated concretely as objects, and as such, are subjected to the transformations of the primary process in much the same way that Freud described for verbal residues. The theme echoed by all of these writers is that in all three The passage simultaneously illustrates the interrelatedness of the input dysfunction, heightened sensory awareness, and the primary delusional experience in schizophrenia.
Terms like "input dysfunction," "immediacy hypothesis," and "concrete attitude" designate qualities that reflect the operation of the primary process. Earlier it was argued that the impairment of the reality-oriented secondary process is related to a disruption in the ego's normally continuous and implicit identification with the self. The impairment of the secondary process enables the emergence of the florid characteristics of the primary process. Thus, many of the well-described traits of dreams, hallucinogenic drug states, and acute schizophrenia can be related to what has been called a decathexis of the self-boundaries, or more specifically, to a disruption of the ego's ongoing synthesis of self-representations into a continuous, coherent self. This relationship can be partly explained by, and readily seen, in discussing the altered experience of time that occurs in the three states (MacKenzie 1965). 
Speaking of dreams and psychosis

Biological Considerations
It will be noted that the quotations given in the introduction to this article emphasized the connection between dreams and endogenous psychosis. The subsequent section was principally concerned with the analogy between endogenous and drug-induced psychosis, though the analogy was extended to dreams where appropriate. The final section emphasizes the biochemical, anatomical, and neurophysiological correlates of the analogy between dreams and hallucinogenic drug states.
Aserinsky and Kleitman ( 83 serotonin turnover. Aghajanian, Foote, and Sheard (1968) used an intraneuronal recording technique to demonstrate that intravenous or intraperitoneal administration of LSD to rats resulted in a sharply reduced firing rate in neurons of the midbrain raphe nuclei, but not in neurons outside of the midbrain raphe. These raphe neurons were identical with the serotonin-containing neurons described by Dahlstrom and Fuxe (1964, 1965) . Further experiments revealed that this reduction in unit activity was due to a direct effect of LSD on the cell bodies of these neurons (Haigler and Aghajanian 1973) . It was shown that 2-bromo-LSD, a congener of LSD without hallucinogenic properties, was much less effective than LSD in inhibiting unit activity of dorsal raphe neurons, and could not produce complete inhibition even when administered in extremely high doses (Aghajanian, Foote, and Sheard 1970) . This result coincided with earlier findings that 2-bromo-LSD did not affect central serotonin metabolism even when given in significantly higher doses than those at which LSD decreased central serotonin turnover (Freedman 1961; Rosecrans, Lovell, and Freedman 1967) . Since LSD and 2-bromo-LSD are equipotent in peripheral serotonergic systems, this raised the possibility that the unique inhibitory effect of LSD upon the discharge rate of dorsal raphe neurons might account for its hallucinogenic properties.
This latter possibility received support from the finding that LSD, psilocin, 2,5-dimethoxy-4-methylamphetamine (DOM), N, N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT), mescaline, and 5-methoxy-DMT, which have similar if not identical psychological effects and which show a high degree of cross-tolerance with each other , all exert a marked inhibitory effect upon dorsal raphe neurons (Aghajanian, Foote, and Sheard 1970; Aghajanian and Haigler 1975; Mosko and Jacobs 1977; Jacobs 1978) . Moreover, the relative potency of these hallucinogenic drugs in depressing the discharge rate of these neurons corresponds to their relative potency in various psychological and perceptual measures in man (Wolbach, Miner, and Isbell 1962; Snyder, Faillace, and Hollister 1967; Szara 1970; Trulson, Stark, and Jacobs 1977 ). Thus, every major member of the class of hallucinogenic drugs, agents which can cause an altered state of consciousness that shares several common properties with dreams and with acute schizophrenia as outlined above, is uniquely capable of exerting a pronounced inhibitory effect upon the soma of serotonin-containing neurons of the dorsal raphe nucleus. Other psychoactive drugs, such as the opiates, the belladonna alkaloids (atropine), and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), do not exert this primary physiological action, and produce altered states of consciousness which are clearly distinguishable from those produced by hallucinogenic drugs (Jacobs 1978; Jacobs and Trulson 1979a) .
Closely allied to the serotonin hypothesis of schizophrenia was the REM phasic event intrusion hypothesis (Dement et al. 1969 ). This hypothesis held that a defective serotonin gating mechanism allowed some phasic events of REM sleep to intrude into the waking state. It was based on the observation that pharmacological or ablative interference with serotonergic neurotransmission enabled the emergence of pontine-geniculate-occipital (PGO) waves, monophasic slow potentials which are normally confined to REM periods, into the NREM and waking states. The occurrence of these waves seemed to coincide with halludnatory-like behaviors in animals. It was proposed that PGO waves were the "minimal neural substrate" (Dement et al. 1969, p. 792) of dream images, and that the intrusion of PGO waves into the waking state might give rise to the hallucinations of schizophrenia.
Further research demonstrated, however, that the eye movements of REM sleep occur just before PGO waves in the lateral geniculate body (Sakai and Cespuglio 1976) . Therefore, the notion that eye movements occur in response to hallucinated visual images caused by the intrusion of phasic PGO waves must be rejected (Jouvet 1979) . Furthermore, REM sleep occurs without interruption even after complete destruction of the ascending PGO system (Laurent et al. 1977; Jouvet 1979) . Thus PGO waves are not the "minimal neural substrate" of dream images.
Just as it was theorized that PGO waves could explain the visual hallucinations of schizophrenia, so they were invoked to explain the LSD state. Since PGO waves were known to be under serotonergic control, and since LSD was known to inhibit the discharge of serotonin-containing neurons, it was reasoned that LSD might produce waking hallucinations by introducing PGO waves into the waking state (Stern, Morgane, and Bronzino 1972) . Experiments showed that LSD in fact confined PGO waves to REM periods (Henriksen, Jacobs, and Dement 1972; Brooks 1975; Ruch-Monachon, Jalfre, and Haefely 1976) . Thus PGO waves are not the neural substrates of drug-induced hallucinations. Jouvet (1979) has concluded that PGO generators are responsible for the motoric programming of oneiric behavior. to that which typically produces amphetamine psychosis in humans produced the "hallucinatory" behaviors and resulted in large decreases in serotonin and 5-HIAA in all brain regions examined. The appearance of the behaviors and the serotonin decrements followed a time-course that parallels the typical appearance of psychotic symptoms in human amphetamine psychosis. Thus, the serotonin hypothesis can account for the onset of "hallucinatory" behaviors in both the amphetamine model and the hallucinogenic drug model of psychosis in the cat. An identical time course for the appearance of hallucinatory behaviors following chronic amphetamine administration has been seen in rats (Nielsen, Lee, and Ellison 1980) and in monkeys (Ellison, Nielsen, and Lyon 1981) . Since the time course of these behaviors is virtually identical to that which is seen in humans, there is a strong possibility that changes in serotonergic neurotransmission may occur in the chemical model of psychosis in man.
The serotonergic model of dreams and hallucinogenesis presented above has a number of difficulties. In cats, the behavioral effects of LSD outlast the depression of dorsal raphe unit activity by several hours . Readministration of LSD 24 hours after the initial dose produces marked depression of raphe activity, but little behavioral effect. Dissociations between raphe unit depression and "hallucinatory" behaviors have also been seen with other hallucinogens (Trulson, Heym, and Jacobs 1981) . Lisuride, an ergoline derivative, exerts a rapid, direct inhibitory effect on dorsal raphe neurons (Rogawski and Aghajanian 1979), produces limb flicks and abortive grooming in cats (White, Holohean, and Appel 1980; Marini et al.
1981
), but is not hallucinogenic in man. Mescaline, unlike other hallucinogens which produce a direct effect, produces only an indirect suppression of dorsal raphe unit activity (Haigler and Aghajanian 1973) . As for the dramatic depression of raphe units that occurs during REM sleep, a recent experiment involving pontinelesioned cats that display REM sleep without atonia suggests that the discharge rate of raphe units may reflect changes in motoric activity rather than changes in state of consciousness (Trulson, Jacobs, and Morrison 1981) . The lesioned cats showed only a small decrease in raphe unit activity in passing from waking to NREM sleep to REM sleep compared with nonlesioned controls.
These findings question the significance of the discovery that dorsal raphe neurons behave similarly in REM sleep and in hallucinogenic drug states. Nevertheless, the preponderant evidence currently favors a role for a common mechanism, depressed serotonergic neurotransmission, in these states (Jacobs and Trulson 1981; White and Appel 1982) .
Mandell (1980) tested a variety of psychoactive agents and found that only hallucinogens inhibit raphe cell firing without a compensatory increase in serotonin synthesis. When LSD is given in conjunction with PCPA, an inhibitor of serotonin synthesis, the effects are synergistic . In man, depletion of serotonin by reserpine enhances the effects of hallucinogens (Isbell and Logan 1957; Freedman 1963; Resnick, Krus, and Raskin 1965) . MAOIs (which theoretically increase serotonergic neurotransmission) attenuate the effects of hallucinogens (Sai-Halasz 1963; Resnick, Krus, and Raskin 1964) and suppress REM sleep. LSD hastens the onset and prolongs the duration of REM periods (Muzio, Roffwarg, and Kaufman 1966) .
Other data that suggest convergent mechanisms have implications for schizophrenia. LSD and PCPA produce identical "hallucinatory" behaviors in cats (Dement et al. 1969; . PCPAtreated cats do not exhibit a REM rebound after experimental REM sleep deprivation. Human sleep studies have shown consistently that acute schizophrenics do not have a REM rebound after experimental REM sleep deprivation (Neale and Oltmanns 1980) . In man, PCPA administration suppresses REM sleep, but is not followed by a REM rebound upon drug termination (Mendelson, Gillin, and Wyatt 1977) . The REM sleep abnormality and hallucinatory behaviors produced by PCPA in cats are reversed by administration of 5-hydroxytryptophan, a serotonin precursor, or by chlorpromazine, a drug used in the treatment of schizophrenia (Zarcone 1979) . There is a substantial body of electrophysiological (Miller et al. 1975; Dray et al. 1976; Aghajanian 1976), anatomical (Miller et al. 1975; Pradhan and Bose 1978) , behavioral (Costall and Naylor 1974; Costall et al. 1975; Giambalvo and Snodgrass 1978; Waldmeier and Delini-Srula 1979; Carter and Pycock 1979) , and biochemical (Kuczenski 1979) evidence in support of a putative role for serotonin in the direct inhibition of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the substantia nigra, neostriatum, and nucleus accumbens. A depression of serotonergic neurotransmission, which, as detailed above, is precisely what takes place during hallucinogenic drug and REM sleep states, would result in a loss of this inhibitory influence. Such a mechanism 86 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN could be invoked to explain the putative dopaminergic hyperactivity within these structures which forms the basis of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia.
It is well established that an understanding of interactions among neurotransmitters is a crucial step toward understanding the mechanisms responsible for regulating REM sleep (Pujol, Keane, and Jouvet 1978; Morgane 1981) . Surely a knowledge of such interactions will improve our understanding of hallucinogenic drug states and schizophrenia as well. The recent finding that LSD, mescaline, psilocin, and DMT, but not lisuride or methysergide (a serotonin antagonist), are uniquely capable of facilitating the excitatory effects of serotonin and norepinephrine upon facial motoneurons (Aghajanian 1981 ) is intriguing. The currently popular activation-synthesis model of dreaming holds that dreams occur when certain pontine reticular cells (FTG cells) become excitable through the loss of serotonergic and noradrenergic inhibitory influences (Hobson and McCarley 1977) .
It is probable that dorsal raphe unit activity is mediated by tonic noradrenergic input and by selfregulatory serotonin autoreceptors (Aghajanian 1981 ). An agent which behaves as a specific autoreceptor antagonist might prevent the reduction of raphe unit firing which normally takes place during REM sleep and hallucinogenic drug states. Behavioral studies could clarify whether reduction in dorsal raphe activity plays an essential role in the psychological manifestations of these states. The basic analogy elaborated in this article dictates that a pharmacologic agent which can: (1) antagonize a biological mechanism which is common to hallucinogenic drug states and REM sleep; (2) attenuate the psychological effects of hallucinogens and suppress REM sleep (or reduce the primary process content of dreams) may be of potential benefit in the treatment of acute or incipient schizophrenia. It is hoped that continued research into the mechanisms of dreams and hallucinogenic drug states will augment research into the mechanisms of schizophrenia, and vice-versa. By understanding the similarities and differences between these three states, it may become possible finally to validate the comparisons made between them throughout the recorded history of philosophy and medicine.
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